

Democracy in Danger S2 E15 Between Progress And Putin

Will Hitchcock [00:00:03] Hello, I'm Will Hitchcock.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:05] And I'm Siva Vaidhyanathan.

Will Hitchcock [00:00:07] And from the University of Virginia's Deliberative Media Lab, this is Democracy in Danger.

News Reporter [00:00:13] Day and night in the bitter cold, hundreds of thousands of reform-minded Ukrainians have chanted their candidate's name. Angry that the West friendly Viktor Yushchenko had been robbed of the presidency.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:25] In November 2004, hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets in the Ukrainian capital of Kiev and in cities around the country. They did so in a civil resistance movement that soon became known as the Orange Revolution.

News Reporter [00:00:40] But tonight they cheered with more hope. In a dramatic move, Ukraine's Supreme Court threw out the official election results, which had declared the Kremlin backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, the winner.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:52] The Ukrainian national election had just ended in chaos. There had been widespread evidence of corruption and fraud. But these protests led to a brand new election, and that election changed the course of Ukraine's political history.

News Reporter [00:01:06] It sets the stage for a potential Cold War style competition over Ukraine.

Will Hitchcock [00:01:11] Now Siva, these days, a lot of people, quite understandably, when they think of Ukraine, probably think of the Russian threats and war and conflict there. Or you might think of the weird, bizarre details of the life and times of Rudy Giuliani, who, as you know, is being investigated right now for his apparent role in shaking down the Ukrainian government for dirt on Joe Biden during the 2020 presidential campaign. But obviously, Ukraine has a much richer, more interesting history than that. And overall, it has a positive story to tell about the course of democracy under very difficult circumstances.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:01:47] Yeah, that's right. And you know, Ukraine's conflict with Russia over Russia's occupation of Crimea is ongoing. The Kremlin has been backing a war in the eastern region of Donbass waged by pro-Russian separatists against the government of Ukraine. And yet, Ukraine's institutions have, by all accounts, held. In 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky, a comedian turned politician, became the country's first Jewish president, winning Ukraine's runoff election against an incumbent, with 73 percent of the vote.

News Reporter [00:02:22] The 41 year old television comedian with no political experience, now the leader of a country at war with Russia.

English Translation of Volodymyr Zelensky [00:02:32] We did it together.

Will Hitchcock [00:02:35] It's an amazing story. And to figure it all out, we've invited historian Serhii Plokhii to brief us on the complex history of Ukraine and help us make sense of where things are today.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:02:45] Serhii is the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University and is the author of, among several books, "The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union." Serhii, welcome to Democracy in Danger.

Serhii Plokhii [00:03:01] Well, thank you for having me.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:03:02] Serhii, you wrote a general history of Ukraine in 2015 called "The Gates of Europe." Why did you write that book and what's the significance of its title? What do you feel is the most important thing that Americans should know about Ukraine right now?

Serhii Plokhii [00:03:19] Ukrainian is a new country on the map of Europe and on the map of the world. Ukraine got into the news in the United States and worldwide because of the dramatic developments in 2013 and 2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and what was known about Ukraine before that was known through the narratives that were constructed by the countries powers, elites that ruled over Ukraine for decades and centuries, and particularly the Russian narrative before that Polish narrative, Austria, Hungarian or German. And Ukraine was looked at as a battleground between different countries and empires and powers until eighteenth century or maybe the 17th century until today. There is a good, good reason to think about Ukraine in those terms. But what I wanted to say also that Ukraine is not just a place where the great powers of the world meet and come to agree. This is also a nation in its own right, the nation that tried to declare independence, to achieve independence five times in the 20th century. So it didn't come out of a blue in 1991. This is the country and the nation that has an agency of its own. And that was the basic message that I wanted to deliver.

Will Hitchcock [00:04:45] Serhii, let's talk about that agency that Ukrainians and this nation has exercised recently. So on this show, we've talked about countries that are having a crisis of democracy, in which there's backsliding, in which there's really alarming erosions of democratic norms and rules. And that includes Brazil, Russia, and so on. But it feels as if Ukraine is bucking the trend. As if it lives in a bad neighborhood, but it's managing to improve its democracy, or at least it seems it has done so over the past 15 years or so. I want you to take us back to the Orange Revolution of 2004 and just talk a little bit about what your perceptions of that event were at the time. As a scholar and as an analyst, what did you make of it? What was this sense that you had? Was this unprecedented or did you feel, no, this is the Ukrainian people once again trying to stand up for a kind of autonomy?

Serhii Plokhii [00:05:38] In the 1990s in particular, before to 2004 the political scientists, specialist in international relations referred to Ukraine as a democracy by default. And it turned out to be a good thing because democracies by design really don't work well, in particular in that neighborhood. And Ukraine emerged as a democratic country for a number of reasons. And one of those was this really very rich and very diverse history of the region, where you have parts of Ukraine that were for decades and centuries within the borders of Austria, Hungary or Poland or the Ottoman Empire or the Russian Empire. And they come with their own sense and understanding of national identity, and they come with their own political traditions. For example, the western part of Ukraine was more involved in the experience with electoral democracy in Austria, Hungary or in Poland than, for

example, central or eastern parts of Ukraine. And all of these regions, they have to find common language. And Ukrainians realize that very early on in 1993, we have in Russia the bombing of the Russian parliament, rewriting of the Russian constitution, creating a constitution that Vladimir Putin now certainly benefits from in Ukraine. There is also a crisis, but there are elections, there is no shooting, and there is a constitution that gives a lot of power to the parliament. And in 2004, there was attempt to reverse this democratic course of the development of Ukraine, to steal the elections, to impose elements of authoritarian regime. And the Ukrainians said no.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:07:28] Well, so that we've talked a bit about 2004, that the Orange Revolution, I mean, that was certainly an inspiring moment for many of us who were able to watch it from afar. Let's hop forward to November 2013, which from our perspective sort of felt and looked similar at that moment. Ukraine blew up with a major protest movement that's generally referred to as the Maidan or Euromaidan revolution or demonstrations. Then the government of the president at the moment, Viktor Yanukovich, had made a decision to postpone the signing of an agreement with the European Union that would have signaled closer ties with Europe. But of course, Yanukovich was very close to Moscow, very close to Putin. And these enormous protests erupted, right? And ultimately led to the ouster of Yanukovich. So that seemed to be a high point, but things haven't turned out so good since then. Could you tell us what else, what are we missing from this story? What's happened since? What has been the ultimate effect of the Maidan demonstrations of 2013?

Serhii Plokhii [00:08:33] There are clear parallels between the events in 2004 and then 2013, but there are also differences. The events of 2013 ended up in violence, the first violence in Ukrainian history since it became independent. I remember, with regards to the Orange Revolution of 2004, some of my friends were saying, what is wrong with you Ukrainians? You can't have a protest that wouldn't look like a street party. And that certainly street party, that peaceful process, that festival of freedom came to an end in 2013. The events had two layers. One layer got this name in the term used to define those events as your revolution or Euromaidan that was about orientation towards Europe, and another where it got its name in the name Revolution of Dignity. Because Ukrainians showed in mass on the main street of Kiev after the police beat up the students and that, that was the red line for the majority of Ukrainians that they refused to stay at home: "We will not allow any government to treat us and our children like they were treated. We will not allow the government to do what the government wants to do."

Will Hitchcock [00:09:51] I just, I want to pick up on that, because I'm, I'm struck by this tradition of mobilization in the face of violence, of police brutality, maybe of, of, of authoritarian tendencies. Where does Ukraine get this sense of civil society and civil mobilization after having lived in the Soviet Union for so long under terrible conditions? What is the source of this ability to mobilize against authoritarian regimes?

Serhii Plokhii [00:10:22] Well, in my book, "The Case of Europe," I write that Ukrainians are excellent and accomplished rebels, and lousy state builders. So Ukraine historically lived under foreign rule and controlled for, for centuries. Ukraine is also the place that is known through the Cossacks, and Cossacks and through their rebellions and revolts against the empire. Ukraine produced the largest anarchist movement and of Nestor Makhano, the biggest peasant army in the Russian empire during the revolution. So in terms of mobilization against the state, Ukraine never had any problem at all. So what we see now after 2013 and 2014 and this ongoing military conflict and war going on in Dombas and war with Russia, effectively, is that Ukrainians for the first time started to

mobilize around their state. And this is a big, big change historically. But in terms of standing up to their rights, Ukrainian history is full of examples like that.

Will Hitchcock [00:11:31] I love that that notion of being great rebels, but lousy state builders. That's, that's kind of a romantic but appealing national characteristic.

Siva Vaidhyathan [00:11:39] And we've seen it elsewhere.

Will Hitchcock [00:11:40] Right. You've mentioned the Russian story a little bit. Let me just come to that. So following the Maidan revolution, Russia invades Ukraine and Crimea and then eventually annexed Crimea. Why? What was going on in that conflict?

Serhii Plokhii [00:11:58] Well, indeed, this is unprecedented in European history, at least since World War II. The closest parallels would be the Anschluss of Austria and the taking over of Sudetenland. So that's, that's where the historical parallels are when you think about Crimea or you think about Dombas. And the main reason for Russia going all the way -- and at least on two occasions sending its regular army into the battle, not just supporting the revolt and rebellion -- is that Ukraine is central for the Russian project and the Russian identity on a number of levels. One is national identity and history. The majority of Russians believe that the origins of Russian state are in Kiev. And Putin went on record more than once saying that Ukrainians and Russians are the same people. What he means is not that he and the Russians are Ukrainians. What he means is that the Ukrainians allegedly are Russians. So that is that is one level of complexity. Another one is that the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991 after Ukrainian referendum for independence; December 1st. Ukrainians didn't vote to dissolve the Soviet Union. They couldn't care less about what is happening with the rest of the Soviet Union. They voted for their independence. But their independence meant for Russia and for others, that the Soviet Union is gone. It was dissolved within one week after that referendum because Ukraine turned out to be the second largest Soviet republic. Russia wasn't prepared to continue the experiment with the Soviet Union without the second largest partner. And today, Russia's attempts to re establish its control of the post-Soviet space are facing enormous problems if Ukraine is not on board. That is why you see the level of escalation, the level of brutality really breaking any, any international law standards and creating a new historic precedent.

Will Hitchcock [00:14:05] Serhii, why has the annexation of Crimea been allowed to stand -- this defiant act? Why is there not been adequate international response?

Serhii Plokhii [00:14:14] There was very little international response, despite the fact that in accordance with the Budapest Memorandum, after Ukraine gave up its part of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, there were assurances given by Russia, United States, UK about the territorial integrity of Ukraine and sovereignty of Ukraine. And, of course, all of that was violated. The lukewarm response that followed, in my opinion, is the indication that the world actually was not prepared at all. And there was also another thinking in terms that the majority of the population in the Crimea were ethnic Russians. So it was almost like the West was looking at Germany's behavior in Czechoslovakia, the Sudetenland. That OK, yes, it was done in violation of all international rules, but maybe there is a bigger truth about that, given that the majority are ethnic Russians. And then, the idea was that it was an exception. It was a one-time thing. This is not an indication of the trend in general. This is Russia gathering Russians and Russian citizens and Russia will not go further. And that certainly perception changed with Dombas, with Syria. And it turned out that this very, very indecisive response to the Crimea opened the door for much more aggressive policy of Russia, not only in Ukraine, but worldwide.

Siva Vaidhyathan [00:15:49] So we've seen and, we've talked about now, conventional military intervention. We've discussed political machinations and political interference in the workings of Ukrainian democracy coming from Moscow. But there's another level to this, of course, and that is the cyber war that Ukraine has faced from Russia for nearly a decade now. You know, in many ways, this, the tactics of the cyber war were first practiced on Estonia. I think Ukraine gets the harshest version of it. But, of course, the Russian tactics that cyber war, both interfering in computer networks and computer servers and flooding Internet sites with misinformation, disinformation, et cetera, it seems to be happening in much of Eastern Europe, happening in France, happening in Italy, and, of course, notoriously in the United States. What has it been like in Ukraine to face this disinformation war, this cyber war?

Serhii Plokhii [00:16:48] Well, the annexation of Crimea and then the war and then the war in Dombas was prepared by this cyber war and really the influence that the Russian TV channels and Russia-supported channels in Ukraine and in Ukrainian information space. So before anyone was talking about this warfare, the Ukrainians already had on the TV channels a program that was called "Stop Fake." So with a special program dedicated to the issue, OK, that's what we hear. That's the reality. That's what we're dealing with.

Siva Vaidhyathan [00:17:22] Ah, like inoculation, inoculation against what they expect.

Serhii Plokhii [00:17:25] Right, right. And again, the question is how effective it was. It was effective in some regions with some categories of population less effective with others. But it even got into the field of history and history right in where there was a popular history and popular history site that was created to educate people about history. So this is one side of the story. Another side of the story is, of course, cyber attacks. And we don't know yet everything about the colonial pipeline. Again, the fingers are pointed at Russia. If this is the case, I just want to say that before the Colonial Pipeline, there was the shutdown in the same way of the energy systems in Ukraine, and it was two or three years ago. So it looks like that Ukraine serves as a polygon for Russia to test the cyber muscles and also to conduct international warfare. So that front is open. The conflict is not over. But it's also very interesting how Ukrainians react to that. And at the very beginning, they were really serious doubts and debates where the Ukrainian government should create a special ministry dealing with information and misinformation, really in the middle of the war. The part of the society was strongly against that because they looked at that as the possibility, as a temporary measure that could become permanent in terms of the really reducing the, the space of freedom in the Ukrainian informational space.

Will Hitchcock [00:19:06] You know, Serhii, you will know far better than most people the rather vulgar line attributed to Nikita Khrushchev that that Berlin was the testicles of the West and whenever he wanted to make the West scream, he would squeeze on Berlin. And I can't help but think that Putin thinks something of Ukraine in the same role. That whenever he wants to make the West worry, to make the Germans worry, to make the Americans fret, he can push on the Ukraine issue. I mean, isn't this what Putin's game is? Ukraine is a button he can push whenever he wants to get back at the West a little bit or the stakes higher than that?

Serhii Plokhii [00:19:47] Well, Will, this is a great parallel. Of course, I know that saying by Khrushchev, but I never, never really connected it and thought in those terms about Ukraine. But you are absolutely right, because what we see in Ukraine, it's not just war on Ukraine. It's not just an attempt to reestablish Moscow's control over the past imperial

post-Soviet space. It's also war on, on the West, in broad terms. That includes Europe and that includes certainly the United States. The recent so-called maneuvers on the Ukrainian borders clearly fits the model that you are describing. This is an attempt to get noticed again and a threat not only to Ukraine in terms of the possible invasion, but also threats to Europe and to the United States. So this is something that becomes maybe better understood now than it was back in 2014, 2015. And this mobilization of the forces on the Ukrainian borders happened also after President Biden agrees with the question that Putin is a killer. So I would like to say that again, I can't agree more with Khrushchev's metaphor and with the parallel.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:21:06] Well, so we've on this program, we have talked a bit about far right parties, often authoritarian parties rising in Germany, in France. And of course, we've talked at length about the transformation of the Republican Party in the United States into essentially an anti-democratic force. Is there a similar domestic homegrown party or movement in Ukraine that echoes many of the xenophobic, perhaps anti-Semitic positions that these other parties take? Or are all of Ukraine's anti-democratic threats coming from Moscow?

Serhii Plokhii [00:21:49] Well, there is no question that the main threats are coming from Moscow. Certainly there exist in Ukraine, this right wing groups in which parallel developments in Europe and to a degree in the United States as well. They're very visible, very loud, but extremely marginal force in Ukraine. They can't get into parliament in Ukraine. They can't cross the five percent threshold so that they're not present at all in the Ukrainian political space. In that sense, the Ukrainian security services believe that some of this right wing groups actually are funded by Russia. And the point is to have a good photo-op. The reality is, again, as I said, that those groups are extremely marginal. Another card that is being played, it's anti-Semitism in Ukraine. And not to be cavalier in any way about anti-Semitism in any country or not to discard very difficult relationship between Ukrainians and the Jews. Historically, anti-Semitism is not something that is basically part of the identity of thinking of absolute majority of Ukrainians. Otherwise, Ukraine would not have the only Jewish president outside of Israel. Volodymyr Zelensky is probably quite unique in Ukrainian history that he maintains that level of popularity. So, again, I don't want to say that anti-Semitism is not a problem at all, but I want to say that actually Ukraine after 1991 really demonstrates the level of tolerance, of acceptance of non-Ukrainian groups and cultures that are quite unique for the region and certainly, certainly quite new in terms of Ukrainian history. That is a very positive, very positive development. Again, Ukraine was able to survive in 2014 because an alliance was created across the national linguistic and religious lines -- alliance between Russian speakers, Ukrainian speakers, Jews, Ukrainians in defense of Ukraine. If that would not happen, we would not talk about Ukraine in its today's borders.

Will Hitchcock [00:24:05] Serhii, despite all of the challenges, problems, war, revolutions that Ukraine has faced in the last decade and more, democracy seems to be deeply enough rooted that it can actually flourish. It is showing signs of growing and becoming stronger in Ukraine. Zelensky, for once, has a party big enough so that he has a mandate to govern and his cabinet is made up of many young people. The new parliament is made up of a lot of new figures in politics. Is this a sign that a new generation has taken root in Ukraine and that Ukrainian politics can look forward to moving away from the the ghosts and the corruption and so forth of the past? What is the significance of Zelensky tenure so far for, for democracy in Ukraine?

Serhii Plokhii [00:24:52] Well, first of all, clearly there is a generational change in Ukrainian politics. And there were high hopes during the first year of Zelensky's tenure. But for a number of reasons, this trend actually didn't continue into Zelensky's second year. So the government was fired partially because it didn't have much of experience and also mishandled certain things, partially because there was a strong push back from vested interests and oligarchic interests in Ukraine. So the jury is out there to see whether the promise that came with the new generation, with the arrival of Zelensky -- of really reshaping Ukrainian government, reshaping Ukrainian society -- whether they will deliver on that promise. There were concerns during the first year of Zelensky's rule that, again, as you said, he got the party strong enough to control the entire parliament. And that was unprecedented in Ukrainian history. The questions and the voices will come in: "OK, maybe we are witnessing the rise of the new authoritarian rule." That really turned out to be an unjustified concern. So, yes, it's the departure is there, they still run the country ruled without coalition, but there are groups and there are divisions within the party itself so it's as pluralistic as any other parliament. So, again, the concerns about democracy turned out to be unfounded. Concerns about what will happen in terms of the fight on corruption, they are still with us today.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:26:29] And what do you think about the long term prospects and stability in Ukraine? I mean, right now there seem to be 100,000 Russian troops on the border. And we know that Ukraine faces so many choices in continuing. Should Ukraine attempt to be better integrated with Europe economically and politically? And what would it cost Ukraine to do that? How do you feel about the, the long-term prospects?

Serhii Plokhii [00:26:56] Well, I feel very positive about long-term prospects. The standard formula for the creation of a nation is really a revolt against an empire. And this is exactly what is happening now in Ukraine since 2013, 2014. So war brings a lot, a lot of suffering, death, economic hardship. But war also helps Ukrainians, the majority of Ukrainians to to define themselves and to appreciate the importance of their state. I mentioned before that Ukrainians are great rebels so now there is appreciation of the state and, and perception of the state that it is our state, it is not somebody else's state, somebody else's government imposed on us. So from that point of view, there is a major historical turn in Ukraine, and that's what it takes to be a nation. Short-term, I am really very concerned. I'm really very concerned about the potential war, about the corruption, about the reluctance of Europe in particular to play a more important role in support of reforms in Ukraine, defense of Ukraine. So I'm very optimistic long term, I'm very concerned short-term

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:28:09] Well, Serhii Plokhii thank you so much for joining us today on Democracy in Danger.

Serhii Plokhii [00:28:17] It was a real pleasure, thanks again for having me.

Will Hitchcock [00:28:27] That was Serhii Plokhii, professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University. He's the author most recently of "Chernobyl: The History of a Nuclear Catastrophe," and he's the director of Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:28:40] Democracy in Danger is part of the Democracy Group Podcast Network. Visit DemocracyGroup.org, to find all of our sister-shows. We'll be right back after this message from our friends.

Larry Lessig [00:28:55] This is Larry Lessig. For the past 15 years, I've done absolutely everything I possibly can to help build the movement to get Congress to pass fundamental reform of our broken, some might say, I think I said, corrupted democracy. But of all the things I've done, certainly the most fun has been the podcast Another Way, produced by Equal Citizens. If you're enjoying the podcast you're listening to right now, then I can almost guarantee you're going to love Another Way. You can find us, you know how this works, at every single podcast feed that there is. This is Larry Lessig, thanks for listening to this pitch.

Will Hitchcock [00:29:41] So, I teach the history of World War Two to UVA students, and we go over the issue of appeasement a lot. You know, that's the time when Britain and France did nothing to stop Hitler as he was beginning his aggression and and slowly carving up, gobbling up Austria and then parts of Czechoslovakia before the Second World War actually exploded. And students always ask, as they should ask, why didn't the West do something? Why didn't they save these small democratic countries from the the vicious Nazi monster? Don't they know that appeasement only leads to more aggression? And now here in Ukraine, we sort of see something similar unfolding. Russia is using claims of ethnicity and history to assert its right to dismember Ukraine. And the West is not really doing much at all. Why not? Well, the answer is the same now as it was then: The West doesn't want war with Russia, the cost is too high. But, you know, the danger of that is the old lesson of appeasement. That aggression can lead to more aggression. And Putin is clearly testing America's, he's clearly testing Europe, he's testing the West. And right now it's been contained. But unless Putin gets a very stern message, and that's, and that's dangerous, it can lead to a kind of turning away from these small democratic experiments that are very much in the interests of the West to support. So it's a real dilemma.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:31:04] Look, if Ukraine moves closer to the European Union and moves closer to NATO, you know, that invokes a moral obligation, if not a legal obligation for European countries and perhaps the United States and Canada to do what they can to protect Ukraine, to bolster democracy in Ukraine. And the thing is, the toolkit is broader than military action. The toolkit involves and includes economic support, better, better cultural interaction, right? We could, we could do a better job of student exchange and scholarly exchange and journalistic exchange. We could do a better job, in this country, of getting people to recognize Ukraine as its own country, its own civilization, as something that doesn't just shudder in the shadow of an aggressor neighbor. That's the real value of what Serhii is telling us and what we can actually learn from Ukraine. So all of that can be part of supplementing any effort to strengthen the institutions of Ukraine, which clearly have popular support.

Will Hitchcock [00:32:18] I think the stakes are enormously high in the Ukrainian case. I think that we, the United States and Western Europe is in fact already in a in a state of war with Russia. And I say that not lightly, but because we have to reconceptualize in the 21st century what war really looks like. It's pretty clear that Russian bad actors were behind the shutdown of the Colonial Pipeline, that basically crippled the southeast of the United States for a couple of weeks. Now, we don't know if that was Putin's direct order, but connect the dots. And we're in a state of conflict with Russia, it's a geopolitical conflict, it's not an ideological one. It's about how far Russian power can extend both in the East and in the West. And so Ukraine is just one front. There's a cyber war front, there's a Ukrainian front, there's the cyber activity of Russia, in Europe itself, there is a conflict over energy and the flow of natural gas -- that's another way of Putin to exercise power over Europe. And so my guess is that the United States, behind closed doors, already views the stakes in Ukraine as very high, but they also don't want to trigger an open conflict, a ground war,

with Ukraine, and probably for that reason doesn't want Ukraine in NATO, which would, as you say, commit the United States to backing up NATO militarily. But that shouldn't blind us to the stakes of this case. It's, this is really the tripwire for democracy in the West.

Will Hitchcock [00:33:47] That's all we have this week on Democracy in Danger. Next time, we'll pivot directly to Russia and speak with New Yorker staff writer Masha Gessen, who knows firsthand what oppression and resistance there looks like.

Masha Gessen [00:34:00] I left Russia at the end of 2013 with my family because the government was threatening to take my adopted son out of the family, and by implication also threatening the biological kids because they were being raised by a lesbian couple.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:34:17] We have some news for you, our second season will be wrapping up soon, but we have more in store for you coming this fall, including some very deep dives on democratic crises, social movements and revolutions, around the world and across time. Now, if you have any ideas for any of these stories, let us know. We're on Twitter at @dindpodcast. That's at @dindpodcast. Or you can go to DinDanger.org and leave a comment on any of our show pages.

Will Hitchcock [00:34:48] Democracy in Danger is produced by Robert Armengol with help from Jennifer Ludovici. Our interns are Denzel Mitchell and Jane Frankel.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:34:56] Support comes from the University of Virginia's Democracy Initiative and from the College of Arts and Sciences. The show is a project of UVA's Deliberative Media Lab. We're distributed by the Virginia Audio Collective of WTJU Radio in Charlottesville. I'm Siva Vaidhyanathan

Will Hitchcock [00:35:14] And I'm Will Hitchcock, we'll talk to you next time.