

Democracy in Danger

S4 E14: In Ukraine, Hell and Hope

Will Hitchcock [00:00:03] Hello. I'm Will Hitchcock.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:04] And I'm Siva Vaidhyanathan.

Will Hitchcock [00:00:06] And from the University of Virginia's Deliberative Media Lab. This is Democracy in Danger.

Unknown [00:00:12] Russian troops now have their sights trained on the Donbas.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:16] Over the past three months, we've watched in horror as the Russian military has pounded Ukraine.

Unknown [00:00:22] Lobbing unguided rockets and artillery into Ukrainian villages.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:00:27] It's created the worst humanitarian crisis in Europe since the Second World War. Untold war crimes have been committed by the invaders.

Unknown [00:00:35] It was a cowardly, cold blooded killing of unarmed men by Russian forces.

Unknown [00:00:40] This was a school which was being used as a shelter.

Will Hitchcock [00:00:44] More than six and a half million people have fled the country.

Unknown [00:00:47] Living in people who hadn't yet managed to bring.

Will Hitchcock [00:00:50] About a third of Ukrainians have been displaced.

Unknown [00:00:53] Luba fled Ukraine with a single small bag, leaving everything else behind.

Will Hitchcock [00:00:58] By United Nations and U.S. estimates as many as 20,000 soldiers have been killed, thousands more wounded. And the Ukrainian government says the civilian death toll will be way higher.

Unknown [00:01:09] The big black hole is really Mariupol, where it's been difficult for us to fully access and to get a fully corroborated information.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:01:18] But amid this tragedy, we have also seen something remarkable. The Ukrainians have stood strong under the leadership of Volodymyr Zelensky. They've defended their cities, their villages, their towns, and they've forced the Russians for now into some kind of stalemate.

Unknown [00:01:36] Overnight, Ukrainian forces pushing Putin's army back closer to his own borders.

Will Hitchcock [00:01:42] And just last week, one of Russian leader, Vladimir Putin's mid-ranking diplomats at the United Nations resigned in protest, calling his own country a

threat to the world. And on the same day, speaking to the World Economic Forum, Zelensky called on global leaders to punish Russia with even more sanctions.

Unknown [00:01:59] There should be maximum so that Russia and every other potential aggressor who wants to wage a brutal war against its neighbor would clearly know the immediate consequences for their actions.

Will Hitchcock [00:02:12] But inside Russia itself, the conflict has been sanitized by state controlled media.

Unknown [00:02:17] It really is a growing fear and a climate that sort of a noose is tightening.

Will Hitchcock [00:02:23] Even calling the Ukraine invasion a war, can land you in prison.

Unknown [00:02:27] We've seen dozens of people being arrested here over the last 45 minutes. Now, what the police have been explaining here is that there is no authorized anti-war protest.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:02:37] Well, here to talk with us about the invasion of Ukraine and the prospects for peace and democracy is a journalist who's been covering the conflict. Peter Pomerantzev have recently returned from Ukraine where he was reporting for The Atlantic. He's written extensively about post-Soviet Russia and the role that disinformation plays in derailing its once democratic aspirations. Peter's two books are: Nothing is True and Everything is Possible and, more recently, This is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War Against Reality. Peter, welcome to Democracy in Danger.

Peter Pomerantzev [00:03:12] Thank you for having me.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:03:14] Well, Peter, maybe you could start by sharing some of what you've seen and been through recently on the war front. We're especially interested in this story you wrote recently for The Atlantic about one family, the Horbonoses there from a Ukrainian village that was besieged in the early days of the invasion, and they were forced to live for several weeks in their cellar with a handful of Russian soldiers. How did you come across the story and what did you learn from this story?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:03:43] So the story was told to me by my colleague, a Ukrainian journalist and editor, Andrey Bertarelli, who's one of the first journalists to enter the village after it had been liberated. After a month, it was held for a month by the Russian forces, and he came across this family. Their home has been completely destroyed. When I got there, there was just a sort of rubble where the home they'd been building for 30 years was. Their beautiful orchards completely destroyed. Everything. All that they had left was kind of the cellar, which the big cellars, like a cellar that acts as a kind of a pantry as well for lot the people in these villages. So you can store food down there. And it was it's a big one. It's like, I don't know, maybe seven meters by seven or something. And so when the Russians invaded, five Russian soldiers moved in because they wanted to stay underground, because there was a lot of artillery shelling going on from all sides. And this was a very unique experience in that these five soldiers and I'm not taking them, is kind of representative of everyone, but they're still an interesting sample, but not monsters. And they were invading soldiers, but, you know, they didn't torture or they weren't sadistic. They were slightly older. And basically over a month, the Horibus's is kind of wore them down. They talk to them all the time. The captain asked them, what are you doing here?

What are you doing here? And by the end, the soldiers who started a very different attitude to the war, were pretty damn despondent. And a couple of them even apologized. Again, we have to be careful with sort of five soldiers and one cellar. In the next village, the soldiers are raping and murdering. But if you actually look at the sociology that we have from Russia, there is a correlation. You know, on the one hand, there is supports for the war in Russia. On the other hand, once you dig into it, some of the support is very thin, emotionally. And there's a lot more sort of cynicism than the Kremlin propaganda would have us believe.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:05:36] Well, certainly. And from your earlier work, the question of cynicism, that's that seems to be the defining spirit of Russia in the post-Soviet era, in the Putin era. Right. So Putin has spent years trying to get the people of Russia to believe in nothing. Right. To believe that everybody is corrupt. To believe that everybody is after them. And now he's in a position where he's trying to summon the will. Right. Summon belief. Summon trust. In order to execute something quite large. Now, you also spoke with President Zelensky. What did you learn from that conversation?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:06:11] Well, I had spoken to Zelensky two days before that, and Zelensky had told me that he'd spent a lot of time trying to reach out to the Russian people. He'd worked in Russia, a sort of mid-level, successful celebrity in Russia. His big fame came in Ukraine. But he did spend six years trying to crack the Russian market. He toured it. He'd been on TV at 7 p.m.. I mean, he's a very successful sort of comedian. And he was struggling with it like like whenever he tried to reach out to people personally or through media, he just found there was a wall. He found that people just don't want to take on the responsibility and the reality of the war. What was interesting with the Horbonose's was, you know, soldiers can't deny the reality of the war. So that wasn't an issue for them. But what was interesting is, was and I think that this might be an important point, is that with the soldiers, it was all about kind of focusing not just on the war, but also on that kind of personal interests, showing how the Kremlin was being manipulative and uncaring of its own soldiers. So sometimes, you know, trying to reach out to populations, any populations essentially, might mean starting with what they care about. And that's not necessarily pleasant work. You know, you really just want to scream, what are you doing? But the more you understand their perspective and their priorities, the more of a chance you have to engage them. So, you know, that might be about things to do with their personal future or the future of their children or all these things which might seem secondary during a time of war. But actually, that might be the point of engagement. Yeah.

Will Hitchcock [00:07:42] Yeah. Peter, would you mind if I ask you a personal question? Many of our guests, like you, have a personal connection that drives their professional work and their interests. If you don't mind, would you tell us a little bit about yours? You were born in Kiev when it was still part of the Soviet Union. Your parents fled as dissidents, and you've been writing for years about Putin's Russia and the Russia Ukraine conflict. How does your background and your family's story shape what you do?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:08:07] Look, I think it shapes it completely. I mean, generally when I think about writing, I've often been like I think everybody in my generation have been very interested in this question of subjectivity and objectivity. Can you be objective when you're always driven by subjective perspectives? And my path towards an attempt to objectivity is actually by a radical subjectivity. That's kind of a journalistic choice I made quite early. In the sense that if I revealed to the reader where I'm coming from, I open up a possibility of a dialog with them. I'm sort of laying out all my biases. And when I do that, hopefully the other person can go well here. You know, here's where I'm coming from and

here's probably my biases, and that's approach each other. So it actually highlights my background in my writing, not just because it's better storytelling usually, but also as a kind of position where I think the objective can emerge from a place of very honest subjectivity. So I am fully informed by my past, very much from the kind of Russian-Ukrainian emigre intelligentsia. I grew up with books until the age of seven. I thought the only professions were poets and artists didn't think there was any other professions. So I'm clearly coming from a very, very specific place. And, you know, both my books are kind of very much informed by that.

Siva Vaidhyathan [00:09:19] And both your books show a rather frightening and effective, multi-faceted method of propaganda on behalf of Russia and the Putin regime. And what we're seeing now is pretty alarming, pretty fascinating. We see almost all people in Russia buying some version of Putin's story about why this invasion was necessary. Right. People in Ukraine being fascists, U.S. or NATO's backed aggression that was preempted. Right. How is this propaganda so effective and what are the prospects for poking holes in this propaganda wall? The notion of a sealed media ecosystem seems so alien. Is that what we're seeing here?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:10:08] So I don't see why it's so unusual. I mean, I live in America now. Where? What? People think that the election was stolen. So, you know, we see inside America how where people choose to live in an alternative reality. The Russian system is obviously much more closed and getting more close by the day, including an attempt at a very leaky firewall. But the information is out there. If people want to find out the truth about the war, they can do it with one click. So we're talking much more about people's motivation. It's not the supply side of getting information, it's the demand side. And look, propaganda is, as you guys know, works and it satisfies and manipulates deep emotional needs and anxieties. This long term narrative that the Kremlin has been building actually for hundreds of years, but especially very strongly for the last seven years, has been, yeah, it's this conspiracy against Russia. You know, all the world is against Russia or the West against Russia. And you're right. I mean, it seems the stuff about fascists in Ukraine or de-Nazification in Ukraine is coming out and they're decreasing that. It's not working for them. And what they're really stressing is this is all American NATO and this incredible phrase "we had no choice but to do this" because that gets rid of responsibility. That kind of implies that there's some nasty force that you've got to do something about, you know, all these sort of vague plethora of conspiratorial thinking. So that's that's very effective. That gives very deep look. He still hasn't done conscription. He hasn't called it a war. You know, he's still kind of saying with like on the edge of mobilization, maybe he'll go full tilt at some point. But at the moment, it's still officially not a war because he feels that that's too much. He can't quite gin up that sort of enthusiasm. It's a much more passive, acceptance, of the inevitability of conflict rather than enthusiasm for it. And that's actually framed much more in this sort of group identity where doing the virtuous thing, you know, Ukrainians are committing atrocities which are really manipulated by the West. We're good. We stand for justice and peace and honor and all that kind of stuff, which very interestingly in the Russian discourse goes hand in hand with sadism. It's very interesting. The more they talk about these high ideals, the more atrocities they themselves commence. It's a it's a very interesting effect.

Will Hitchcock [00:12:18] Peter, your reflection about how to get into the minds of the participants in the conflict on both sides leads me to ask a question about, you know, how does this end? So your colleague at The Atlantic, Anne Applebaum, has written in an essay recently that Putin's defeat in the war is crucial for European stability. And there are writers and policymakers that have embraced the idea that Russia needs to be defeated

and perhaps even humiliated. And that's a word I've seen lately. American foreign policy seems to be going in that direction towards weakening Russia in this conflict. And I just wonder what you think about this notion. There are those who say that's a that's a foolish policy, a dangerous policy. We need off ramps, we need compromise, a negotiated settlement, taking these two general sort of thrusts of argument. How do you think Ukrainians read this kind of debate?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:13:09] So I would put the question a bit differently. For me, it's much simpler. Russia has to stop being a threat to its neighbors, to the wider world, and ultimately to its own people. That has to be our baseline. Yeah, we have a deeply, deeply, deeply sick society and a deeply sick regime, which is driven by centuries of internal patterns of humiliation and aggression, which has not even started any sort of reckoning with its own genocidal past and its own aggressive and expansionist ambitions. That's who we're dealing with. The idea that you could do a deal based on balance of power or spheres of influence is a complete misreading of what Russia is. When Russia talks about spheres of influence, it's not talking about something rational that we can hammer out in it in a deal in Helsinki, it's talking about a desire to humiliate and often destroy and make miserable those around it. It's not to do with their feelings of security in any kind of rational way. So that's who we're dealing with. The realist analysis won't help here. It's much better to bring in the kind of psychoanalysts like Erich Fromm or Henry Dix, who tried to understand Nazi psychology. That's what we're dealing with. So the question is, how do you mitigate the threat from this power? Now, victory in Ukraine- essential. Securing Ukraine's borders- essential. Making sure Ukraine is part of a new global security architecture which stretches, I think, from Australia and Japan all the way to Europe, which includes the threat from China as well- essential. We have to start becoming much more imaginative about how we envision global security. There is no normal to return to. What I didn't like about this offramp metaphor. Off ramps to where? To a road that we were on before? That road is gone. What are we talking about? We're in a new world. Russia is one of the many inflection points in that process. So secondly, ensure that sanctions are strong enough, clear enough, and imminent enough for Russia to understand that going further is just not somewhere where it can go. In the long term, of course, we should try to imagine a different sort of Russia, just as we did with Germany. You know, in Germany in Second World War, German exile writers like Thomas Mann would go to the BBC and talk about a Germany of the future that would be at peace with its neighbors, that didn't define itself through being an empire. And of course, we can help create that imaginative space, but there's very little we can do about rapid change in Russia. That's something that will come from inside, as it always has done in great powers that Russia. We can make very clear that we're not budging, though. We can make very clear that we're not budging. We have to be very, very clear about war crimes. Here is the list of the war criminals. And we will not do business with these people.

Will Hitchcock [00:16:08] Peter, are we at the beginning, middle or end of this conflict? What's your gut feeling?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:16:15] Oh, dear, I am completely alone. It's just me and Arkady Ostrovsky from The Economist. We're the only two in a kind of circle of people who know Russia very well or are Russian, who think that the Putin model is much, much, much closer to collapse than people fear. And it's not a gut feeling. It's based on a reading of Russia that he created a system based on a corrupt pyramid of mutual self-interest. That's what the game was. And ideology and resentment. All that psychology played a role, but neither was it the only thing driving people, you know, it was that balance between, yes, we can we can satisfy some of our global resentments and internal humiliations through

the Kremlin's successes. But at the end of the day, society works because people were allowed to be quite entrepreneurial, you know, in that corruption, for example. Not as entrepreneurs, maybe even as bureaucrats, they were allowed to be entrepreneurial. All that's going to go basically, and it's going to shrivel and it is going to be much more a gamble on ideology and a gamble on a very specific ideology, which is a sort of splendid isolationism. Like Russia doesn't need anyone. I think that even though in the polling Russians will say we don't need anyone. If you look at the behavioral data, if you look at the economic data, they do. And that's going to hit a crunch. And I think he may have horribly miscalculated. Horribly miscalculated in the sense that that he's lost his aura of of luck. So Russians are actually very superstitious, partly because at all levels of society, Russians have very little agency, even oligarchs can lose money tomorrow. And the thing about Putin always was, that he had this aura of getting away with it. You know, you try these crazy things like Crimea and get away with it. Often actually, gangsters have, you know, gangster communities have a saying thing about like the gangster leader, "he just has it". No one ever thought Putin was smart. No one ever thought that he was especially brilliant, that strategy or tactics in Russia. But they were like, he's just got IT. He just gets away with stuff. You know, he attacks on oligarchs and gets away with it. He attacks the country, gets away with it, stuff that we would never do rationally. He just can. That aura has completely disappeared. They talk about it on Russian TV. I mean, like they say, whoa, we got this wrong. We should have done it differently. That's the discourse. Now, No one is even trying to hide that it went according to plan. The discourse is now. We should have gotten harder. We should nuke the you know, we should missile them. No one's even trying to pretend now on state TV that this has gone to plan. So he's lost his aura and that aura was the most important thing that he had. What it needs now is for enough people in the system, in the state, companies, in the security services to just stop trying. And Russia change doesn't come from an upswing in protest potential. It comes from despondency. People just stop trying, not just being passive because passive is still going along with the state. The institutions just stop working. Cops stop arresting people, the bureaucrats stop, you know, delivering supplies, the logistics break down, the black market swells. And we have a situation like the Soviet Union and the system just buckles. And at that point, the system just replaces him. So that might not be the huge change in psychology that we've been talking about today, but it'll be the first step. The big change in Russia, the big one, it stops being an empire and becomes a nation. Yeah, I suspect that's not going to happen overnight.

Siva Vaidhyathan [00:19:35] So what are the prospects for Ukraine and its potential for rebuilding, its potential for maybe even restoring its full integrity of its borders? What are the hopes of such a broken and devastated country coming back and building a decent society?

Peter Pomerantzev [00:19:55] I think it has a unique opportunity to genuinely build back better. It's funny, I did a little research in Ukraine about the sociology of Ukraine and values in Ukraine, and people in Ukraine always said-- look, independence is a process. We got our independence in 91, but, now we're learning what it means to have sovereignty. And clearly that has increased a lot. It's completely changed the map of loyalties in Ukraine, the idea of who's a patriot. I mean, the fact that it's a Russian speaking Jewish guy from the southeast is the great war leader of Ukraine is just such a change in the national psychology. The fact that, like, you know, the great heroes of this war have been obviously the army, but also like street cleaners in Kharkiv, who were always seen as Soviet nostalgics, they're the ones who are like, you know, cleaning up the cities and and risking their lives to keep the cities functional during bombardment. The fact they're now the biggest patriots and biggest heroes is is transformative. I don't think we

understand the depth of this transformation. So this is it. So in terms of national cohesion and national idea, it's a huge moment for Ukraine. In terms of the economy, let's look at the positive side. The negative side of Ukraine is that they were stuck in an oligarchical system that they couldn't escape and the oligarchs dominated everything. And yes, it was a pluralistic society. It was a free society. But you couldn't build institutions because the oligarchs would capture them. The oligarchs are now irrelevant. It's a unique moment where they can actually build, not just an identity, that was emerging anyway, but actually build a political economy. That is what the reformers in Ukraine always wanted, and I really hope they will. There is a generation of 30 somethings in Ukraine. Early 40 somethings who don't have the post-Soviet baggage anymore, think differently. It's not that they're Western, they just want to build the country. And there's a lot of them and they're some of those amazing people that I have met. I'm just incredibly optimistic. I think Ukraine is going to be one of the great, exciting, difficult, contradictory, but immensely fulfilling stories and one that actually shows that democracy will win.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:21:57] Well, Peter Pomeranz, thank you so much for joining us on Democracy in Danger.

Peter Pomerantzev [00:22:03] All right, guys. Thank you! I'm going to get on my other call!

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:22:15] Peter Pomerantzev is a journalist and senior fellow at the SNF Agora Institute of Johns Hopkins University. He writes about Russia and Ukraine for The Atlantic. He's the author, most recently of the 2020 book --This Is Not Propaganda: Adventures in the War against Reality.

Will Hitchcock [00:22:33] Democracy in Danger is part of the Democracy Group Podcast Network. Visit Democracy Group dot org to find all our sister shows. We'll be right back after this message from our friends.

Unknown [00:22:45] American politics has reached a moment of existential uncertainty beyond the headlines and news alerts and problems bigger than any one administration. Problems that stem from the deep tensions and challenges in America's political institutions. If you agree and you want to check out politics in question, join Leigh Drummond, Julia Azari and James Wallner as they discuss political reforms the crucial to our democracy. So listen to politics and question to become a more informed, engaged citizen. Search politics in question on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, Overcast, or wherever you get your podcasts.

Will Hitchcock [00:23:26] Siva, there's a picture that Peter painted of a nihilistic, fanatical, ruthless totalitarian dictator in Vladimir Putin and a heroic and fully mobilized and passionate and idealistic and democratic Ukraine fighting for the future not only of democracy, but of stability in Europe and in some ways, you know, the success of the whole Western project. So that's a powerful story, but it's also a frightening one. If the stakes are that high in Ukraine, then any notion that you could have a compromise or a peace settlement or some kind of way out that doesn't involve a very long and very costly war starts to disappear. On the other hand, I was and I am endlessly inspired by what we have seen out of the Ukrainian people. This is clearly a country that is responding to a long and beleaguered history of living under the shadow of Russian oppression. And it's just very, very dangerous. So if you're feeling conflicted and unsure. Join the crowd.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:24:31] Yeah. Yeah. You know, I really appreciate Peter's optimism when it comes to the long term prospects for Russia, maybe even the short term prospects for Ukraine, the ways in which Putin's aggression, his overreach, has blown back upon him and has re-energized a real sense of the potential for solid and reasonable democracy. At least in Europe, the downside, if I may, end with a pessimistic vision, is the stunning way that the world's largest democracy, India has basically sided with Putin has basically turned its own propagand machine into an adjunct to Putin's propagand machine and generated tremendous anti Ukraine and anti-American sentiment all over India. I think the repercussions of that will probably be seen for a long time, and I think having a Russia India axis is something that the United States should be very concerned about.

Will Hitchcock [00:25:35] Yes, indeed, I agree with that. But I also just want to end on one note of reflection. I think our listeners should think a little bit about what this war has done to our own politics and our own vision of the world. So, you know, people who are sort of progressive, liberal champions of democracy often don't believe that war is the way to get anything done. But something has happened in which the script has been flipped. And many of the people who are trying to save democracy at home in the United States are also among those who are arguing for helping Ukraine, because democracy in a European context is at stake there. It's been kind of weird for someone like me who studied the Cold War to hear many of the same arguments of the same language of the Cold Warriors of the 1940s and 50s now being used to argue for the destruction and humiliation of Russia, the breaking of its power, the retreat of Russia from its traditional imperial periphery, and the championing of Ukrainian nationalism. I mean, this is a dramatic change and it may be the right thing to do, but at this moment, let's remember, know where we stand in relation to these historical arguments that have been made both by Americans in the past, as well as by Eastern Europeans who have long wanted America to play a larger role in pushing Russian power out of Eastern Europe.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:26:51] Right. Look. Well, you know, as I look back on the Cold Warriors, you know, you can definitely clearly see their overreach. The point at which they undermined their own cause, undermined the status of United States, the Vietnam War being the best example of overreach, terrible, tragic, stupid overreach. And yet, as we look back, there was a sense that being morally firm about the threats that the Soviet Union presents, not just to the United States, but to the world at large, was justified. And the question was, what is the proper level of intervention? What is the proper level of containment? What is the proper level of aggression with which to deal with that whole variety of aggressive tactics that the Soviet Union engaged in during those years, being well aware of the overreach? Well, are you concerned?

Will Hitchcock [00:27:44] I'm terribly concerned. But let me give you two data points that our listeners will have fresh in their own minds, because these are quite recent. One is the American invasion of Iraq. Mm hmm. Which at the time I strongly opposed, as did about half the country.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:27:59] And your co-host.

Will Hitchcock [00:28:00] And so. So did you. And the reason that we opposed it was because it seemed illegal. It seemed immoral. But it also seemed as if it would fail. And the arguments for failure were there in front of us. It was it was an obvious overreach. And it was also a case in which we all felt manipulated by a story that had been told and retold, and that was clearly phony and had so many holes in it about weapons of mass

destruction and the rest of it. By contrast, here I am basically siding with the Ukrainians. I've been proud of the American response. I've been feeling a sense of something that, quite frankly, has been missing in the last five years, a sense of pride, a sense of dare I say it, you know, a cause. Now that should start bringing a little bit of an alarm bell in the back of your head. When you start feeling as if you have an ideological stake in a conflict, beware, be self-reflective. But nonetheless, I do believe the context of the erosion of democracy at home has been driving liberals to embrace the success and the defense of democracy in Europe. And honestly, I'm okay with that.

Will Hitchcock [00:29:06] Well, that's all we have this time on Democracy in Danger. Don't miss next week's episode, Siva will be chatting with the UVA legal scholar and MacArthur Fellow, Danielle Citron, about social media, the law and even Elon Musk.

Danielle Citron [00:29:19] We saw really deliberate moves by Twitter to tackle hate speech. And here we are, post Buffalo. So I like think it's a really great time for us to talk about this moment with Musk.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:29:31] And coming up soon after that, our season finale. It's a show we're taping live from the American Political History Conference in Indiana. And it will be with many of our best friends. If you are headed to that conference, bring your questions and maybe some complaints.

Will Hitchcock [00:29:48] Check in with us on Twitter in the meantime, @dindpodcast that's d-i-n-d podcast and visit our web page, DinDanger.org for links to what we're reading on show notes and much more.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:30:00] Democracy in Danger is produced by Roberto Armengol and Jennifer Ludovici. Sydney Halleman edits the show. Our interns are Denzel Mitchell, Jane Frankel and Ellie Bashkow.

Will Hitchcock [00:30:13] Support comes from the University of Virginia's Democracy Initiative and from the College of Arts and Sciences. The show is a project of UVA's Deliberative Media Lab. We're distributed by the Virginia Audio Collective of WTJU Radio in Charlottesville. I'm Will Hitchcock.

Siva Vaidhyanathan [00:30:28] And I'm Siva Vaidhyanathan. Until next time.